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Generic and Specific Social Learning Mechanisms in 
Foreign Entry Location Choice 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We combine economic and institutional theories of clustering in foreign entry location choice 
in an overarching social learning conceptualisation. Prospective entrants learn about the 
attractiveness of alternative locations by observing the entry choices of previous investors 
(„models‟). We distinguish two types of learning which differ in observational focus width 
but can and do operate simultaneously. With assessment learning, firms judge the economic 
feasibility and agglomeration benefits of entering a location by observing and following a 
broad set of models. With bandwagon learning, firm-level uncertainty narrows attention to, 
and prompts the following of, specific models, with recentness of model behavior an 
important moderator. We find broad support for our conceptualization in an analysis of 692 
Japanese electronics firms‟ entries into Chinese provinces during 1979-2001.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A major force in the globalization process is the internationalization of manufacturing 
operations. As firms attempt to survive in highly competitive markets, they seek out 
production locations that provide access to attractive local resources. These individual rent-
seeking location processes have led to co-location among firms, resulting in strong national 
and regional clusters of manufacturing establishments. Prior studies on co-location and 
clustering have primarily been rooted in two quite isolated study domains and research 
traditions, in particular in regional and industrial economics on the one hand and 
organizational and institutional (learning) theory on the other.  Studies in the domain of 
regional and international economics (e.g.; Smith and Florida 1994; Head et al. 1995, Head 
and Ries, 1996; Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Chang and Park, 2005; Alcacer and Chung, 
2007) suggest that spatial clustering results from positive externalities to new entrants. A 
second group of studies emphasizes that clustering occurs because firms mimic other firms‟ 
foreign entry behavior. Such organisational mimicry may be due to information spillovers 
between incumbents and potential entrants in a process of observational (vicarious) learning 
(Banerjee, 1992; Baum et al. 2000; Tan et al, 2008). If firms cannot perfectly observe and 
analyze all relevant environmental factors and are uncertain as to the comparative advantages 
of alternative locations, they may instead derive relevant information from observing prior 
entry location choices by other firms. The neo-institutional perspective on locational mimicry 
(e.g., Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillen, 2002; Chan et al, 2006; Li et al, 2007) emphasizes 
the legitimizing effect that previous entries in a location may have under uncertainty. As 
locating somewhere gains recognition as being „rational‟ or „right‟, other firms are more 
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likely to follow, in particular if firms belong to the same institutional group and share a group 
identity.
1
  
 To date, combination and integration of insights of these theories of clustering have 
been limited as they do not share a common language and research paradigm. In this paper 
we attempt to bridge these differences in order to make a twofold contribution. First, we 
integrate existing theories in a single overarching conceptual framework to foster theoretical 
richness, integration and parsimony. Second, while previous studies have tended to 
emphasize either one of the perspectives,
2
 the purpose of the current paper is to explicitly 
juxtapose, rather than oppose, these perspectives and to disentangle the different explanations 
of clustering by deriving contingencies to their respective influence. We therefore model their 
simultaneous operation and empirically test for the theoretically derived contingencies to 
examine their associated relative explanatory power.  
 Our conceptual framework builds on the closest conceptual 'common ground' between 
the two explanations. This common ground is found by viewing clustering in location choice 
as two manifestations of a social modelling process whereby undecided actors learn from the 
exemplary actions provided by a heterogeneous set of other relevant economic actors. We 
examine the working of two simultaneous social learning mechanisms in a comprehensive 
dataset on the location of 692 Japanese electronics firms‟ manufacturing entries into China‟s 
provinces, from the opening of the country to foreign investors in 1979 until 2001. Below we 
develop our hypotheses in more detail and present the results and a discussion of our analysis. 
 
                                                 
1
 An additional perspective on inter-organizational influences on investments abroad holds that firms engaged in 
competitive rivalry follow each others‟ foreign market entry strategies in order to minimize the risk that rivals‟ 
investments have a negative impact on the firm‟s competitive position at home and in other international 
markets (e.g. Head et al., 2002; Gimeno et al., 2005; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Since this explanation is 
relevant for foreign market entry decisions rather than clustering of investments conditional on market entry (the 
approach in our research), we do not specifically focus on the rivalry factor here. 
2
 Exceptions are Gimeno et al (2005) and Delios et al. (2008). The focus of these studies is on distinguishing 
between competitive interaction in home markets and non-competitive mimetic behavior in foreign market entry 
decisions. 
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LOCATION CHOICE 
From a technical-economic viewpoint, the dominant economic theory of clustering in 
location-choice has been agglomeration theory. According to this theory, firms can increase 
profitability by locating in the vicinity of other economic activities and related production 
facilities, due to positive spillovers among these agglomerated firms (Marshall, 1922; 
Rosenbloom, 1990; Krugman, 1991). These benefits of co-location can take the form of, for 
instance, infrastructure quality, available pools of skilled labor and the presence of 
specialized suppliers and important service providers. Previous studies on location by 
multinational firms have shown that agglomeration concerns indeed weigh heavily in such 
choices (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Head et al, 1995; Head and Ries, 1996; Delios et al., 
2000; Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Chang and Park, 2005; Alcacer 
and Chung, 2007; Alcacer, 2007). Firms are attracted to a certain location because of an 
existing mass of relevant industrial activity, typically captured by variables such as the total 
number of previous foreign investors in a location in the same or related industries. 
 Other theories of clustering in location choice do not focus on a direct assessment of 
the „objective‟ attractiveness potentially resulting from the presence of others. Instead, co-
location is seen as an individual entrants' response to uncertainty. Under uncertainty, 
potential entrants look at relevant, knowledgeable others for information. Decision makers 
then combine private information with information inferred from the actions of others in 
order to arrive at a decision. In the informational spillover explanation, firms follow the 
behavior of earlier investors to economize on search cost and reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding decision making (Cyert and March, 1963; Shaver et al., 1997; Gimeno et al. 
2005). This process of following has been dubbed „rational herding‟ or „bandwagoning‟ 
elsewhere (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993), 
and we will borrow the latter term in the present context. Firms carefully observe only those 
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models they consider as relevant comparisons for their own entry location choice situation 
and derive informational value from them.  
 Finally, neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) holds that information derived from other organizations‟ behavior is always ambiguous 
such that firms rely on reputations or status of exemplary firms in order to gain legitimacy 
within their reference group. Firms tend to follow institutional rules prevalent in the same 
social group and mimic actions of other firms in their group environment (Meyer and Scott, 
1983). Such rule-following imitative behavior has been found to play an important role in a 
range of organizational phenomena such as strategic diversification (Haveman, 1993), radical 
organizational change (D‟Aunno et al., 2000) and the entry into new geographic markets 
(Guillén, 2002; Tan et al, 2008; Li et al, 2007).  
 When considered jointly, the various theoretical approaches to clustering in location 
choice share an important feature. They all conceive of locating as a process that is -at least in 
part- driven by social information provided by the examples that others set.
3
 Firms appear to 
take careful notice of the actions and examples of the wider relevant economic community 
when deciding on locations. Thus, decision making on location bears features of a social 
learning or social modelling process, where focal firms learn from the economic (location) 
behavior of others (Cyert and March, 1963). These environmental exemplars can be called 
„models‟ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Each location-choice theory just described involves 
learning from predecessors' (i.e., models') actions, but there are crucial differences in the 
nature of the models being observed and followed. In agglomeration-theory, learning focuses 
on observing an existing heterogeneous set of relevant economic establishments in an area, 
whereas in the other two theories learning focuses on the choices of a much narrower band of 
similar exemplars (informational spillovers) or on the legitimizing actions of some highly 
                                                 
3
 We note that several non-social factors can and will play a role in determining location choice as well. These 
include province variations related to support policies, economic development and market size, and 
manufacturing costs. We take such variations into account later on in our empirical set-up.   
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respected firms and/ or firms in the same institutional group. It is important to stress, that 
these different observational processes and the information the decision maker draws from 
them are likely to operate simultaneously and may each contribute to the decision process. 
An analogy may help to illuminate the distinction between these theoretical explanations. 
When contemplating what place to visit for a good night out, a person may follow a number 
of observational leads. A restaurant location that is often seen to have a large number of 
guests, which provides an enjoyable and lively atmosphere, signals the general attractiveness 
of the place (agglomeration effects). This signal may be supplemented with more specific 
information that the person's friends or family with similar tastes are known to go there 
(information spillovers). Finally, and in addition, the person may be sensitive to knowing that 
many respected members of his profession like to be seen there (legitimizing action). 
 We propose to consider these three explanations of behavioral clustering as emanating 
from two parallel perspectives on social learning from an exemplary heterogeneous mass of 
predecessors. These perspectives differ in their focus of attention, being either wide or 
narrow.  From the assessment learning perspective firms contemplating a location will 
consider the rationality of a choice by observing the existing agglomeration as a whole and 
learn from that. From the bandwagon learning perspective, the various decisions of more 
specific model firms serve as behavioral exemplars. These two types of social learning can, 
and usually will, function simultaneously. The social learning 'lens' therefore combines 
hitherto separate explanations of isomorphic organizational action from different strands of 
literature. The juxtapositioning of the two types of learning in one framework has the 
advantage of being both parsimonious and integrative. It is parsimonious because it uses a 
single theoretical concept- that of social learning- to understand co-location from two hitherto 
separately treated parallel mechanisms (i.e., agglomeration and bandwagoning). It is 
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integrative as it allows declaring clear contingencies for the operation and relative 
explanatory power of either mechanism. 
 For clarity of exposition, Table 1 provides a summary of the conceptual distinctions 
between assessment and bandwagon learning. Note that the learning mechanisms are 
juxtaposed rather than opposed and tend to operate simultaneously, because they stem from 
different perspectives taken when observing previous model behavior (as in the restaurant 
choice analogy above). Firms typically take clues both from the general movement of models 
and from different, more specific subsets of models.  
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------- 
We now proceed with a more detailed look at location choice under each learning 
mechanism. 
 
Assessment Learning 
 In the assessment mechanism of social learning, firms make a general assessment of 
the feasibility of locating in a particular area based on existing economic activity. Imitation in 
this mechanism is frequency-based (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Thus, a broad range of 
firms function as a model, as long as they contribute to agglomeration externalities. The sheer 
presence of others signals the level of general economic embeddedness that a firm may 
expect upon locating there: models give an example by 'being there'. The information that 
potential entrants derive from these models is of a general and cumulative nature. Following 
the models‟ example by clustering with them is expected to generate positive spillovers on 
profitability, feasibility and sustainability of the firms‟ foreign expansion, which are known 
as “agglomeration benefits” (e.g. Rosenbloom, 1990; Head et al, 1995). These benefits are 
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predominantly related to clustering of firms within the same industry (e.g. Head et al. 1995; 
Henisz and Delios, 2001: Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Chang and Park, 2005). The larger the 
existing concentration of these models, the stronger the potential agglomeration benefits and 
the stronger the attraction on new firms to the region. Therefore, with assessment learning, 
firms will favour a location with the largest total number of generic model establishments. It 
is the cumulative mass of previous entries that counts.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: (Assessment Learning) The larger the total number of previous entries in a 
region by model firms, the greater the odds of a firm choosing that region. 
 
 Although the positive impact of foreign agglomeration on location choice of firms has 
been supported by earlier findings, previous studies of the effects of agglomeration on firm 
performance have generally not been able to confirm an expected positive impact (e.g. Baum 
and Mezias, 1992; Appold, 1995; Chung, 2001; Chung and Kalnins; 2001). This has been 
attributed to the greater competition between firms in agglomerated areas to attract customers 
or to secure quality inputs (e.g. skilled labor), leading to increased price competition and 
higher input costs (Haveman, 1993; Chung and Kalnins, 2001; Sorenson and Audia, 2002; 
Chang and Park, 2005; Miller and Eden, 2006). This 'competition effect' discourages further 
co-locating at higher levels of foreign agglomeration as the marginal return of co-locating 
declines and may eventually become negative. We therefore qualify our first hypothesis by 
specifying a curvilinear (inverted-U shaped) impact of foreign agglomeration on the odds of 
locating. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  At higher total entry counts, the marginal impact of the total number of 
entries on region choice declines and eventually becomes negative. 
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Bandwagon Learning 
 The bandwagon mechanism of social learning emanates from firm-level uncertainty. 
As neo-institutional scholars (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993) have argued, 
organizations under uncertainty mimic the behavior of specific reference groups in their 
institutional environment. That is to say, the bandwagon mechanism implies firms being 
selective in whom they will follow. Mimicry is trait-based (to borrow a term of Haunschild 
and Miner, 1997) as it prompts firms to follow, for instance, large firms over small firms 
(Gilbert and Lieberman, 1987), similar over dissimilar firms (Baum, Li and Usher, 2000), or 
high status over low status models (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Rao, Greve and Davis, 2001). 
As a result, bandwagon learning is of a more sophisticated nature than assessment learning in 
which one essentially 'follows the crowd'. Instead, with bandwagon learning, firms observe 
models (i.e., other firms) that provide an example of the focal behavioral act (“locating 
somewhere”) and thereby give specific information about the relative attractiveness or the 
legitimacy of a certain behavioral option. However, because not all examples are equally 
relevant, firms will be sensitive to the characteristics of the models as these inform them of 
the relative applicability of the models‟ behavior for their own decisions. As bandwagon 
imitation can be based upon informational and institutional considerations (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf, 1993), firms are expected to follow models with strong informational and/ or 
legitimizing value. 
 In informational bandwagons, models are selected and followed that provide the 
strongest informational value (Bikhchandani et al, 1992), which is potentially highest for 
models that are similar to the focal firm. As similarity is an important driver of cognitive 
categorization of the environment (Porac and Thomas, 1990), similar firms are likely to 
become important referents for action, attracting a great deal of attention (Scott, 1992). If the 
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bandwagon is of an institutional nature, models that lend legitimacy to the firm and its 
behavior are observed and followed. It is created by following the actions of models whose 
actions serve as referents of socially appropriate firm behavior. Many institutional studies 
have shown that various forms of tightly-knit networks of firms can be a source of normative, 
coercive or mimetic pressures to conform (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As members 
frequently interact within a limited group they become aware of, and compare, their actions 
with, network partners, creating isomorphic tendencies as they strive for legitimacy within 
those groups. These networks can be created in various ways, for instance through 
interlocking directorships (Haunschild, 1993; Davis and Greve, 1997), acquaintanceship 
(Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989), personal board contacts (Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 
1993) or -at a country level- trade ties (Guler, Guillén and Muir McPherson, 2002). They can 
exert an isomorphic influence on a host of operational and strategic decisions in firms, 
ranging from anti-takeover measures (Davis, 1991) to technological innovations (Ahuja, 
2000) and foreign entry decisions (e.g. Guillen, 2002; Hensiz and Delios, 2001).  
 Finally, the legitimacy of particular location choices may also be created by the 
previous actions of highly visible or admired and prestigious firms. Institutional theory 
suggests that firms seek legitimacy by imitating the actions of these high status firms (Di 
Maggio and Powell, 1983). When high status firms locate in a certain area, this lends locating 
in the region an image of rationality and appropriateness, which other firms are likely to 
follow in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders. It is not that the high 
status necessarily 'rubs off' on imitators –although this may be a motive (Lieberman and 
Asaba, 2006)- but that behaving isomorphic with a high status firm helps to mobilize 
valuable real and symbolic resources (i.e. investor capital, tolerance, approval, respect) 
toward the imitating firm (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 1983). Several studies (e.g., 
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Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Burns and Wholey, 1993; Han, 1994) have corroborated 
the attractiveness of high status or prestigious organizations as objects of imitation.  
 We note that the distinction between informational and legitimizing value driving 
bandwagon behavior is often not clear-cut. While prior behavior of high status firms has 
legitimizing value as it is seen as appropriate behavior, one of the reasons why it seen as 
appropriate may be that these high status firms have proven to take value-enhancing 
decisions in the past. Hence, followers may also weigh the informational clues derived from 
high status firm behavior. Similarly, frequent inter-firm interactions within institutional 
groups may also facilitate communication of foreign investment experiences and the 
underlying advantages of specific foreign locations, such that informational clues are mingled 
with legitimizing value. In the approach taken in this paper, we examine the role of these 
types of specific bandwagon models without drawing inferences on the precise relevance of 
informational and legitimizing value embedded in bandwagon model behavior.   
 Summarizing, our expectations regarding bandwagon learning relate to a positive 
impact of prior entry by specific sets of models, i.e., those that are similar in characteristics, 
similar in terms of institutional group membership, or perceived to be high in status and 
prestige. This expectation is summarized in hypothesis 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  (Bandwagon learning) The larger the number of previous entries in a region 
by specific model firms –firms that are similar to the investing firm, that 
belong to the same institutional group, or that are perceived as high status–
the greater the odds of a firm choosing that region. 
 
Agglomeration and Bandwagon Learning contingencies: Uncertainty and Recentness 
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 In order to distinguish assessment from bandwagon mechanisms, we have so far 
examined differences in the objects, i.e. differences in the types of models being followed 
under either mechanism. However, there is good reason to expect differences in the 
conditions under which the role of bandwagon learning in location choice will gain or lose 
importance relative to assessment learning. In particular, the impact of model behavior on 
uncertainty reduction is likely to be a function of the recentness of the model's actions. 
Furthermore, as bandwagon following originates from decision uncertainty, one would expect 
it to be affected more strongly under conditions of uncertainty. This effect is not expected to 
play a major role in assessment learning as agglomeration benefits are not uncertainty-driven 
but stem from local externalities. The lower part of Table 1 summarizes these differences. 
The associated arguments are developed below.  
 The search for effective solutions naturally begins with the most recently used ones 
(Cyert and March, 1963). Moreover, especially when circumstances are changing, recent 
action information is expected to have a premium for all followers as it has a stronger 
potential to reduce uncertainty now. These 'recentness principles' were shown to hold for 
learning both within and between organizations. In intra-organizational learning studies, 
recent experience has often been found to have a stronger bearing on current behavior than 
experience from the more distant past. For instance, Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) 
showed that in the shipbuilding industry recent experience was a more important predictor of 
current production than cumulative output. Similarly, Sampson (2005) found that only recent 
(that is: not cumulative) R&D alliance experience has a positive impact on collaborative 
returns. Part of this has to do with forgetting and cognitive limitations (Argote, 1999), but 
another important part relates to the declining perceived relevance of the past for the present, 
especially when circumstances change over time. When it comes to imitation between 
organizations in the context of location decisions, recentness of previous model behavior is 
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an important theoretical separator between the operation of the assessment and the 
bandwagon learning mechanism. In assessment learning it is by definition the cumulative 
existing economic activity that matters the most and recent (additional) entries are not likely 
to be of particular additional importance. In contrast, in bandwagon learning recent examples 
of models locating in a certain area are more likely to influence a focal firm‟s decision than 
relatively 'old' examples, as the former provide the most accurate, up-to-date information on 
the current attractiveness of the location. It is firms‟ moving to the area that elicits following: 
their example consists of "going there" instead of "being there". Followers will be sensitive to 
when their precursors' behavior took place, and recent examples should exert a bigger 
influence than relatively old ones.
4
 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The more recent the entry of specific (bandwagon) models in a region, the 
greater the odds of a firm choosing that region. This does not hold for general 
(assessment) model entries.   
 
 Different degrees of firm-level uncertainty among the following firms will translate 
into different valuation and relevance of model behavior for entry location decisions. Some 
firms will be affected stronger by the model‟s information than others: they are more 
susceptible to social influence (Strang and Tuma, 1993; Greve, 2005). As decision experience 
is a prime way of decreasing decision uncertainty (Levitt and March, 1988), we expect a 
firm's own previous entry experience in the target country to be negatively associated with 
                                                 
4
 Previous studies on inter-organisational mimicry have taken a variety of, often contrasting, approaches with 
respect to the recentness of prior model behavior. Several studies have operationalized models' observed 
behavior as cumulative examples, e.g., as their sum or as a percentage of total organizations that have adopted at 
t-1 (e.g., Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillen, 2002; Tobert and Zucker, 1983). Other papers have taken the 
number of adoptions in a previous year as the relevant set of models (Chan et al, 2006; Li et al, 2007; Delios et 
al, 2008). Still other papers (e.g. Baum and Ingram, 1998; Baum and Dahlin, 2007) have implicitly taken 
recentness into account by applying a time discounting method to the aggregated experiences of models, which 
puts higher weights on recent model behavior. We are unaware of any study in this area that has specifically 
tested for the impact of the recentness of model behavior on follower behavior. 
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their tendency to imitate others. Experienced firms can base their decisions more readily on 
their own learning experience in a country. As firms with previous experience face less 
uncertainty, the relative informational and legitimizing value of bandwagon model behavior 
is reduced and they are less likely to mimic specific model firms‟ prior location choices. The 
assessment valuation and agglomeration benefits attributed to the mass of model firms 
located in a region, in contrast, remains unchanged and firms may moreover be better able to 
assess the value of agglomeration benefits. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 4:  The positive impact of specific (bandwagon) model entries on region choice is 
weaker for follower firms with previous experience in the target country. This 
is not the case for general (assessment) model entries. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 We test our hypotheses using a comprehensive dataset on Japanese electronics firms‟ 
manufacturing entries in the different provinces and administrative regions of China between 
1979 and 2001.
5
 This is an appropriate setting to test our hypotheses for several reasons. 
First, since China re-opened its doors to foreign investors only in 1979, these data allow us to 
follow the impact of agglomerations and previous foreign entrant behavior from inception to 
the recent past. Second, these Japanese location choices were surrounded by considerable 
levels of uncertainty concerning the political, regulatory and macroeconomic environment for 
foreign entrants. The observation period witnessed uncertainty surrounding the impact of the 
Asian financial crisis on the Chinese economy (1997-1999), future exchange rate policies, the 
SARS crisis, and the general operating environment for Japanese firms in light of popular and 
political sentiment against Japan. Still, Japan remains one of the largest investors in mainland 
                                                 
5
 For convenience, we consider the terms regions and provinces as identical in the remainder of this paper. 
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China, behind Hong Kong but ahead of the US (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2006). 
Furthermore, Japanese firms are important players in the global electronics market 
(Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 2005), and affiliate location choices of Japanese firms were 
previously found to be particularly responsive to the location of previous Japanese 
investments (e.g. Head et al. 1995; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Martin et al. 1998; 
Henisz and Delios, 2001; Chung and Song, 2004). The setting therefore appears intuitively 
attractive to study the influence of organizational interactions on location choices. 
 The data on Japanese manufacturing entries in China were taken from the Asia 
Shinshutsu Denshi Meika (Survey of Japanese electronics firms in Asia) compiled by the 
Japanese Research Institute of the Electronic Industry in 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2002. This is 
an authoritative source on Japanese foreign investments in the broadly defined electronics 
industry with complete coverage of investments by both large public firms and privately held 
small and medium sized firms. The coverage of this data base is much broader, in particular 
for smaller and privately held firms, than the coverage of the often-used directory Kaigai 
Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran (Directory of Japanese Multinational Corporations), compiled by 
Toyo Keizai Inc. (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 2001; Delios et al, 2008). Our data give a reliable 
picture of all entries by both leading electronics firms and suppliers along the value chain of 
the broadly defined electronics industry over the years 1979-2001. This broad definition 
includes final goods ranging from digital cameras and household electrical equipment to 
railway signaling equipment and elevators, and parts and components ranging from 
semiconductors to plastic and metal molded parts. We combined the information from both 
directories to check for data consistency and in order to expand the scope of the affiliate 
counts to other industries than electronics in which horizontal business group members can 
be active.  
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Analytical procedure and model choice 
 Our empirical approach is carefully designed as a test for the comparative explanatory 
power of the different social learning mechanisms. First, we focus the empirical analysis 
deliberately on region choice decisions, given (i.e., 'conditional on') that the firms have 
decided to invest in China. By analyzing decisions on location, we focus on the phase in the 
decision process in which assessment and bandwagon learning processes are expected to have 
a dominant impact. The often studied foreign market entry decision, (e.g. Guillen, 2002) is 
not only driven by location characteristics and organizational interdependence, but also by 
the possession of firm-specific competitive advantages and resources that can be exploited 
abroad, as well as by domestic market positions and developments (e.g. Delios et al. 2008; 
Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 2005). Hence, foreign entry decisions are much more complex in 
nature, which makes it more difficult to isolate the effect of assessment and bandwagon 
learning mechanisms. Analysis of entry decisions would necessitate inclusion of an accurate 
set of firm control variables to cover firm-specific advantage, which is not readily available 
for a broad sample of entrants including small and medium sized firms. This is why the 
current analysis focuses on the region choice, with the firm-specific rationale for foreign 
entry already established. 
 Second, we examine the impact of the different learning mechanisms simultaneously, 
as we argue that prior entries by relevant models contribute to agglomeration benefits at the 
same time as providing information or legitimizing value. We therefore empirically focus on 
„models‟ that can potentially provide strong contributions to both social learning processes, 
being prior Japanese entries in China in the same, broadly defined, industry. The research 
design thus reflects the integrated and comparative nature of the proposed theoretical 
framework.  
 
 18 
 
Dependent Variable: Region Choice 
 The focus of the present analysis is on firms‟ first entries into a Chinese province, 
since additional entries into the same province are likely to be dominated by firms‟ 
experiential learning as well as local intra-group supply relationships instead of social 
learning processes. Through this selection we empirically „contain‟ the potential impact of 
experiential learning and 'same-firm agglomeration' on location decisions (e.g. Lieberman 
and Asaba, 2006). We do make a distinction between a firm‟s first entry into China, - a 
decision for which uncertainty levels are highest – and firms‟ subsequent entries into other 
provinces in China. The distinction between first entries and subsequent entries into 
additional provinces allows us to test Hypothesis 4.  
 In their exploration of alternative locations in China for subsequent entries, the 
location choice process will benefit from the China experience obtained through the first 
entry, and firms will face reduced levels of uncertainty. Although there is substantial region-
specific heterogeneity in investment conditions (driving region choices), there is also a strong 
unifying role of the central government in terms of legislation, the treatment of foreign 
investment and FDI incentives, labour laws and the like, which provides for similar 
experience and circumstances across regions (e.g. Reuvid and Wong, 2000). Experience with 
operating manufacturing affiliates will allow firms to confront actual local circumstances 
with the information that was available on region characteristics ex ante, and to interpret this 
information more accurately in case of subsequent entries. More specific information on the 
attractiveness of other regions may become available by doing business with Chinese clients 
and suppliers that have operations in other regions. These considerations led to a 
comprehensive sample of 441 first manufacturing entries into China and 251 subsequent 
entries into additional provinces.  
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 The focus of our analysis is on the region choice for these entries. China has been 
divided into 28 provinces and autonomous regions and 3 centrally administered 
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai).
6
 As only very limited information on 
province characteristics is reported for Tibet and since the province did not receive 
electronics entries, it is omitted from the choice set. Of the remaining 30 regions, 23 received 
at least one Japanese electronics entry during the 22-year observation period. We consider all 
30 provinces and regions as constituting the relevant choice set for the Japanese entrants. 
Since one could contend that provinces that did not receive any entries may not have been „at 
risk‟ of being considered for entry, we tested whether these provinces are equal substitutes 
for regions that did attract entry. The results of Hausman tests suggested that this was the 
case, such that we included all 30 provinces and regions.
7
  
  All entries of Japanese firms were coded by assigning a 1 to the chosen region and a 
0 to all other regions in the choice set. Our dependent variable is the probability tjiP ,, that firm 
i chooses region j at time t from this set of regions. In case of subsequent entries, the province 
in which the firm has already entered is omitted from the choice set, as we do not examine 
repeat entries in the same province. 
 Table 2 shows the geographic dispersion of firms‟ first entries into Chinese regions 
between 1979 and 2001, distinguishing between first entries and subsequent entries into 
additional provinces. By far the largest numbers of establishments are found in Guangdong, 
followed by Shanghai, and Jiangsu, while a number of other provinces only received one 
entry. The distribution over regions is not very dissimilar for first and subsequent entries, 
                                                 
6
 Chongqing became an autonomous municipality in 1997, but is considered part of the Sichuan province in our 
data for consistency over time. 
7
 The Hausman test examines the validity of an underlying assumption of the conditional logit model: the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (Hausman and McFadden, 1984), which requires that omission or 
addition of a choice from the choice-set does not alter the relative odds among the remaining choices. The 
results of the Hausman tests showed that the null hypothesis of no violation (equality of coefficients across 
models) could not be rejected. The Chi square test statistic has an insignificant value of 4.86 (21 degrees of 
freedom) in case of model 4, Table 4. Similarly, insignificant test statistics were obtained for model 4 in Table 5 
(subsequent entries) and the other models. 
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with the ranking of regions almost identical. It is interesting to note that entrants do not solely 
focus on the most popular provinces; first entries occur also in provinces that receive only 
few overall investments. Top locations for first entries (Guangdong and Fujian) are less 
frequent targets of subsequent entries while Jiangsu is chosen relatively more frequent as a 
subsequent province of entry.  
----------------------- 
Insert table 2 and Figure 1 
----------------------- 
 Figure 1 shows the number of entries of Japanese electronics firms in China by year 
of entry, differentiated between first and subsequent entries,. The early years 1979-1980 
showed no entries as Japanese firms generally adopted a wait and see attitude directly after 
the opening of China to foreign entry. The year 1981 saw the first entry by a Japanese 
electronics firm (Hitachi in Guangdong), followed by a number of entries in 1984. The 
highest entry activity took place in the years 1993-1996 (50-80 entries), but the number of 
first time entries still reached 32 in 2001. Subsequent entries show a rather similar pattern 
with peak years in 1993-1997 and a renewed increase in entry in 2001. 
 
Independent Variables 
Although conceptually the mechanisms of assessment and bandwagon learning can be 
clearly separated, we note that in the operationalization of 'generic' and 'specific' models it is 
difficult to capture these in their 'pure' form. In reality, both mechanisms are to some extent 
operative on all model types that can be distinguished. For instance, agglomeration benefits 
in assessment learning are best operationalized by the number of all previous entries of model 
firms likely to contribute to agglomeration economies. Still, the mere fact that many prior 
entries have been taking place in a particular region will also operate as a legitimizing force 
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and lower uncertainty surrounding the entry decision for potential followers. The extent to 
which any kind of previous entry serves as a bandwagon model depends on model firm 
characteristics, often in relationship with the characteristics of the focal firm itself (e.g. 
entries by „similar‟ firms). Moreover, the extent to which bandwagon model learning occurs 
should be subject to the moderators we specified (i.e., recentness and experience). Ultimately, 
then, the relative extent to which a model indeed has an assessment rather than  bandwagon 
'character' will follow from the outcomes of the moderator analyses testing hypotheses 3 and 
4. 
 
Assessment model identification and measurement (Hypothesis 1a/b) 
 The total number of previous entries by model firms in a region (cf. hypothesis 1) was 
measured by counting the total number of prior electronics manufacturing establishments of 
Japanese firms in each region (i.e., the Japanese affiliate count). Earlier studies on location 
decisions of Japanese multinational firms (Smith and Florida, 1994; Head et al, 1995; Mayer 
and Muchielli, 1998) have reported a strong positive impact of Japanese firm agglomeration 
on subsequent Japanese firm entry decisions. This has been attributed to easier information 
sharing among Japanese firms, national preferences for amenities like schools and 
restaurants, and greater advantages of proximity due to the use of similar just-in-time delivery 
and inventory control systems (e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002). Likewise, agglomeration 
effects, e.g. through the greater availability of specialized suppliers and labor, occur primarily 
within same-industry clusters (e.g. Head and Ries, 1996; Baum et al, 2000). Our focus on 
Japanese firms‟ industry agglomeration has the advantage that it allows for a direct 
comparison of the simultaneous effects of a general assessment learning effect (all prior 
entries) with the bandwagon learning effects that should be stronger for prior entries by 
subsets of firms with specific model characteristics. To test for a declining marginal impact 
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of general agglomeration on the probability of location choice (Hypothesis 1b), we include 
the square term of Japanese affiliate count and expect a negative sign. 
  
Bandwagon model identification and measurement (Hypothesis 2)  
 Regarding models‟ similarity to the focal firm, we chose two indicators of relevant 
informational spillover opportunities between investing firms: similarity of size and similarity 
of industry segment. The importance of size-similarity as a major referent is consistent with 
the 'size-localized competition' phenomenon in organization ecology theory (Baum and 
Mezias, 1992; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Firms of different sizes tend to follow different 
strategies, and rely on different resource mixes (Haveman, 1993), such that actions of larger 
or smaller firms are less likely to provide informational or legitimizing value. Conversely, 
similarly sized organizations draw on similar resources and are likely to closely watch each 
other's (location) choices.  By sharing relevant characteristics with the focal firm, models are 
likely to have faced similar trade-offs in the decision process to locate, increasing their 
informational relevance. Hence, size-similarity can play an important role in informational 
bandwagon learning effects. Prior studies have confirmed that size similarity between firms is 
an important predictor of imitative behavior. For instance, in a study of Californian savings 
and loan associations, Haveman (1993) showed that large banks tend to follow the market-
entry decisions of other large banks. Baum et al. (2000) report significant effects of size-
similarity of Ontario nursing home chains on the location of take-over targets. In the context 
of Japanese firms, size related hierarchy is important (e.g. Sako, 1992) and large and smaller 
firms within the electronics industry are likely to see themselves as belonging to the same 
macro organizational „culture‟ (Peteraf & Shanley,  1997). We assess the impact of size 
similarity through the variable similarly sized firms’ affiliates count, which is the number of 
Japanese affiliates in each Chinese region by firms with a similar organizational size as the 
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focal investing firm. Organizational size is measured by total employment of the Japanese 
parent firm. To assess size similarity we took the size distribution of all investing firms in the 
sample, and classified them into deciles. Each firm that occupies the same or a neighboring 
size decile is defined as similarly sized and its affiliates are included in the count. 
A second group of model firms likely to be followed in bandwagon learning due to 
their similarity with the focal firm, are model firms operating in the same narrowly defined 
industry segment within the broadly defined electronics industry. Entry behavior by firms 
that are operating in similar product markets requiring similar manufacturing inputs and 
serving similar clients, will give more relevant informational clues to new entrants. We coded 
the detailed business line descriptions of the affiliates in the database in terms of their 
respective Japanese standard industry classification. In most cases we could code the industry 
segment at the 3 digit level and sometimes at the 4 digit level. This resulted in a classification 
of affiliates into a total of 37 industry segments. The segments include categories such as 
computers, printers, copiers, measuring equipment, lighting, radio & televisions, resistors & 
capacitors, integrated circuits, connectors, magnetic heads, etc. On the basis of this, we 
constructed the variable “number of same industry segment affiliates”. This is the count of the 
number of affiliates (t-1) in a province classified in the same industry segment as the focal 
affiliate. If the focal affiliate is active in multiple segments, the sum of the prior entries in the 
province in these multiple segments was taken. 
 In the context of Japanese firms, strong institutional ties are present within horizontal 
business groups, or keiretsu.
8
 Horizontal business groups are large diversified groups of firms 
centred around a large bank. The relationship among member firms features interlocking 
                                                 
8
 We control for the influence of vertical business group ties but we do not treat prior vertical group entry 
effects as manifestations of bandwagon learning. In the case of vertical business groups, clustering of firms 
abroad may also occur in order to replicate buyer-supplier relationships established in Japan e.g., Martin et al. 
(1998), in which case clustering is a phenomenon that may be better explained by cumulative within-group 
agglomeration benefits (e.g. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Hensiz and Delios, 2001; Belderbos and Carree, 
2002).  
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shareholdings, stable long-term trade relationships, personnel exchange, and frequent 
information exchange on new markets, business opportunities, and technological 
developments (e.g. Gerlach, 1992; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996). Reports in the business 
press note that discussions within the so-called President‟s Council meetings (the yearly 
meetings of the presidents of the largest firms in the groupings) often center on foreign 
investment opportunities (Mori, 2002). Horizontal business groups are distinctive 
institutional firm groupings in Japan that tie groups of firms together and may exert 
institutional pressures on individual firms‟ behavior (Henisz and Delios, 2001). The 
legitimizing value of previous location choices made by members of these groups will put 
normative pressure on other group member firms to follow. At the same time, the 
informational value of prior group member entries in a province may be important to member 
firms choosing locations for their entries in China. We assess the impact of institutional ties 
within horizontal business groups by including the variable same horizontal business group 
firms’ affiliates count, which is the number of existing manufacturing establishments in a 
Chinese province by Japanese firms that belong to the same horizontal business group as the 
focal firm. Horizontal group affiliation data is drawn from Brown & Company‟s Industrial 
Groupings in Japan. This data source classifies Japanese firms as belonging to one of the 
eight horizontal business groups, i.e. the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, Sanwa, 
Tokai, and IBJ group.  
 We identify high status firms as the largest electronics firms in Japan with the most 
extensive international expansion experience in Asia during the period. We reasoned that in 
the context of foreign location decisions, high status is likely to be carried not only by size 
but also by extensive foreign operations. Due to their broad international experience, these 
firms are in a superior position to judge relative viability of different locations, and their 
location choices therefore lend legitimacy to following firms (e.g. Delios et al, 2008). They 
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are therefore expected to serve as important legitimizing role models in the eyes of major 
stakeholders of investing firms. Taking the 10 Japanese firms with the largest number of 
Asian affiliates in each year of our study resulted in the identification of 16 large electronics 
manufacturers, including all the prestigious Japanese electronics giants like Matsushita, 
Hitachi, Sony, Canon and Toshiba. High status firms’ affiliates count is the number of 
manufacturing establishments in the Chinese province established by these 16 firms. 
 
Assessment and Bandwagon mechanism contingencies. 
 To test the impact of recentness of model behavior (Hypothesis 3) on location choice, 
we calculated the average age of the establishments included in each count variable. Age is 
measured by the number of years the previously established affiliates had been in operation at 
the time of entry of the focal affiliate. For bandwagon counts, the average age of previous 
establishments is hypothesized to reduce the imitation tendency, whereas no such effect is 
expected for the general agglomeration count.  
 To test for the effect of target country (i.e., China) experience (Hypothesis 4) on the 
relative roles of assessment and bandwagon learning, we differentiate between firms‟ first 
region entries into China and firms‟ subsequent entries in additional Chinese regions. The 
latter case represents location decision processes where firms have already obtained 
experience in establishing and operating manufacturing plants in China. Hypothesis 4 
suggests that bandwagon variables play a much more limited role in the location choice 
decision for such subsequent entries, while assessment models counts should remain 
important. 
 
Control variables 
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 In order to correctly attribute location choice decisions to previous model behavior, 
we controlled for the common impact of the Chinese region characteristics on all Japanese 
entrants regardless of previous models' behavior. We take these common factors (termed 
„similar conditions‟ in Haunschild, 1992) into account by including a set of fixed and time-
variant province characteristics, that are expected to affect the general attractiveness of 
specific regions to Japanese firms.  
 First, we control for other electronics establishment agglomeration in the province. 
Other foreign electronics affiliate count is measured as the count of existing electronics 
manufacturing establishments by non-Japanese investors in the province, including those 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. We could not include a further measure for all 
indigenous electronics establishments as no reliable official data exist on these over the 
period that we are investigating. On the other hand, the count of other electronics affiliates 
does include a large number of Chinese establishments, since an important share of the 
entries from Hong Kong and Taiwan in the period are due to „roundtripping‟: Chinese firms 
investing in China through a Hong Kong or Taiwanese subsidiary to benefit from foreign 
investor status (e.g. Xiao, 2004).  Given that the larger and growth oriented firms are most 
likely to make use of „roundtripping‟ and that the electronics sector in China has been 
dominated by foreign owned establishments, the other foreign electronics affiliate count 
together with the Japanese electronics affiliate count should capture the lion‟s share of 
agglomeration benefits to new entrants in China‟ regions. As with Japanese affiliate 
agglomeration, we include the square term of the other electronics affiliate count in order to 
control for potential competition effects in highly agglomerated areas.  
 We also control for within-vertical business group agglomeration effects. Vertical 
business groups are groups of subcontracting firms, spin-off firms and trading companies 
around major large-scale assembly-type manufacturers. In vertical groups, the leading or 
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“core” firm can exert a degree of management control over other member firms, fortified 
through shareholdings, financial ties, and the dispatch of managers. Previous research has 
suggested that stable supplier-buyer relationships within vertical groups are replicated abroad 
(Martin et al., 1998) leading to a clustering of group affiliates in foreign locations (e.g. 
Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Belderbos and Carree, 2002). 
Information on vertical keiretsu group affiliation was obtained from Toyo Keizai‟s “affiliated 
companies data” (Nihon no Kigyou Guruppu). This data source includes information on 
corporate ownership, business groups, and supplier relationships of more than 30,000 
Japanese firms. Complementary information was retrieved for smaller firms from the 
Electronics Manufacturers Directories (Denshi Meika Risuto) compiled by the Research 
Institute of Electronic Industry. Vertical business group affiliate count is the number of 
existing manufacturing establishments in a Chinese province by Japanese firms that belong to 
the same vertical business group as the focal firm. 
 We control for differences in the economic size of the regions by including Province 
GDP. The larger the economic size of a region, the more likely that it will attract foreign 
entry (e.g. Wheeler and Mody 1992).
9
 Inclusion of GDP ensures that the coefficients of the 
count variables are not biased upwards because the agglomeration counts are correlated with 
the region's size. In addition, we include Province GDP per capita of the region as a measure 
of potential demand for foreign entrants' products. Province manufacturing wage of industrial 
workers in the region is included since the cost of labor may have a negative impact on the 
attractiveness of a region if foreign entrants are seeking low-cost and relatively unskilled 
workers (e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002). GDP and wage data were taken from the China 
                                                 
9
 This is a variant of the 'dartboard' theory, which suggests including total land area as a measure of the number 
of potential sites. Land area is not likely to have a major impact on investments in China given the large 
differences in economic development and land habitation between regions. By including GDP we weigh 
potential site area with the level of economic development (GDP intensity) of the region. Alternative 
specifications with population substituted for GDP led to similar results, though with a slightly inferior model 
fit. 
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Statistical Yearbook. We include the dummy variable Province has seaport, which takes the 
value one if a major seaport city is located in the region. If this is the case, multinational 
firms can import and export materials, components, and final goods more cost effectively. 
We also control for the potential effects of past colonial ties of Chinese provinces with Japan. 
This dummy variable takes the value 1 for the provinces Heilionjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin, 
which are part of inner Manchuria, the region in China which was under Japanese control 
between 1931- 1945. 
 Finally, we control for provinces‟ economic policy measures to attract foreign 
entrants. Previous studies have found an important impact of early established zones with the 
broadest range of incentives: the four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and the 14 designated 
Opening Coastal Cities (OCCs). These SEZs and OCCs were the only areas in China allowed 
to provide a range of tax incentives and other preferential treatments to foreign entrants 
(Coughlin and Segev, 2000). The preferential status of SEZs and OCCs changed in 1992, 
from which year on all provinces and regions were allowed to provide tax incentives to 
(export oriented) foreign investors (Reuvid and Yong, 2000: 20-23).
10
 Hence, it can be 
expected that the relative advantage of OCC and SEZ regions became less distinctive over 
time (Delios et al., 2000). We include two dummy variables province has SEZ/ OCC area, 
which takes the value 1 if the province or region has hosted a SEZ or OCC: one dummy for 
the years up and till 1991, and one for the years after. Appendix A provides an overview of 
all variable descriptions. 
 
Modelling and Estimation 
 In order to examine the impact of region characteristics on region choice, we use the 
conditional logit model (Greene, 1997), which has been the statistical model of preference in 
                                                 
10
 We tested for a more general structural break in the model around this time by performing a chow-chi square 
test on the equality of coefficients, but the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal could not be rejected.  
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comparable prior research (e.g. Head et al, 1995; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Chang and Park, 
2005). In this model, characteristics of a choice candidate (in our case: regions/ provinces) 
determine its relative attractiveness and hence the probability that it is chosen from among a 
set of alternatives. The general form of the conditional logit models we test is given in 
equation (1).  
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,,    (1) 
where  tjiP ,, = the odds of firm i to invest in region j rather than in any other region at time t 
 1,tjR = (Control) characteristics of region j at time t-1. 
 
a
tjM 1, = Foreign investor agglomeration count in region j at time t-1. (assessment 
learning mechanism) 
 
b
tjiM 1,, = Firmi-specific model count in region j at time t-1 (bandwagon learning 
mechanism).  
 
The model includes variables measuring counts of models in the region linked to assessment 
learning 
a
tjM 1,  and to bandwagon learning 
b
tjiM 1,, . With bandwagon learning, relevant 
previous entries also depend on the match between previous entrant and focal firm 
characteristics in terms of size similarity, industry segment, and business group affiliation 
(hence the subscript i).
 
Rjt-are time variant and time invariant province characteristics that are 
expected to impact location choice in order to control for „similar conditions‟ faced by the 
entrants. It is important to note that the specification reflects our intention to test for the 
additional impact of previous model entries in bandwagon learning over and above the 
impact of the general previous entry counts, as each 
b
tjM 1,  is a subset of 
a
tjM 1, . This is a 
conscious modeling choice, as our goal is to draw conclusions concerning the impact of the 
 30 
 
agglomeration as a whole (the assessment learning mechanism) and the specific following of 
relevant agglomeration subsets (in bandwagon learning). All the counts are included in 
logarithmic form (after adding 1) since this reduces variance and allows for a direct 
comparison and interpretation of estimated coefficients as elasticities: the average elasticity 
of the probability of location choice with respect to the logarithm of the counts is calculated 
as (S-1)/S times the coefficient, where S is the total number of choices (c.f. Head et al. 1995, 
p. 237; Chang and Park, 2005). All time-varying province characteristics and counts are 
lagged by one year to allow a response time by the choosers, to reflect the proper time-
ordering and to exclude the possibility of simultaneity between entrant and model behavior. 
 It is useful to note here that in conditional logit models, chooser attributes (for 
instance, whether a firm faces a first or subsequent province choice) are not included as 
covariates. Since such traits do not vary between provinces, they cannot as such determine 
which one is chosen. Chooser/ firm traits do have an impact on choices, however, if they 
systematically alter the response to certain choice characteristics. For instance, chooser 
heterogeneity does enter our empirical model where chooser attributes are matched with 
attributes of models, i.e. where only firms in a particular size class are expected to respond to 
previous entries by firms of similar size. Hypothesis 4 suggests a further source of firm 
heterogeneity: it predicts that the bandwagon variables impact on the location choice decision 
for first time entries, but not for subsequent entries. We examined this source of 
heterogeneity in responses by estimating equation (1) separately for firms‟ first entries and 
for firms with previous China entry experience (in order to test hypothesis 4). We employ 
such a „split sample‟ analysis rather than including an interaction term with the assessment 
and bandwagon variables, because a split sample analysis is the more general test 
specification when comparing coefficients between groups of observations, i.e., firms 
(Hoetker, 2007). A split sample test does not assume that unexplained variance is identical 
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between the two groups of entries (first vs. subsequent) and also allows for the impact of 
other province characteristics to differ systematically between these groups, leading to 
consistent within-group estimates.  
 
RESULTS 
 Summary statistics and correlations of the variables are presented in Tables 3a and 3b 
for the first entry sample and the subsequent entry sample, respectively. All variables except 
past colonial ties with Japan are positively correlated with location choice. The correlations 
between the count variables can be substantial and sometimes exceed 0.90. High correlations 
between independent variables are a more general feature of conditional logit models where 
choosers/ firms face the same set of choice/ region characteristics. In our empirical model all 
Japanese entrants in a given year face the same province characteristics. Positive correlations 
are also partly following from the overlaps in the count variables, as the bandwagon counts 
are subsets of the agglomeration counts. Still, the actual overlaps in our sample are not that 
large. On average, of the total number of Japanese affiliates observed in a year, 26 percent are 
similarly sized models, 6 percent are same industry segment models, 32 percent are high 
status models, and 5 percent are same horizontal business group models.  
 
------------------------ 
Insert Tables 3a and 3b  here 
------------------------- 
 
 Results of the analyses of region location choices in China are presented in Tables 4 
(first entries) and 5 (subsequent entries). The first model in Tables 4 and 5 shows the results 
of a base specification containing only control variables. Model 2 adds the Japanese affiliate 
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count variables (assessment learning, Hypothesis 1), model 3 adds the bandwagon learning 
variables (Hypothesis 2), and in model 4 the effect of the recentness (age) of bandwagon 
models is included (Hypothesis 3). The difference in results between first entries (Table 4) 
and subsequent entries (Table 5) allow for a judgment on Hypothesis 4. 
 
------------------------ 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
------------------------- 
 
 The results of the base model 1 in Table 4 are largely consistent with expectations and 
robust across the different specifications. Province GDP and Province GDP per Capita are 
both significantly positive. Provinces with seaports and with preferential SEZ/OCC foreign 
investment zones also attract more entries, with the impact (coefficient) of special zones 
much larger in the period up to 1991 when such zones were the most distinctive features of 
provinces. The average annual manufacturing wage has an unexpected positive sign but is not 
significantly different from zero. The dummy for past colonial ties has a positive sign but is 
not significant either. The same holds for the coefficients of the other electronics affiliate 
counts.
11
 In model 2, the addition of the Japanese affiliate count variables significantly 
improves the model‟s explanatory power: the likelihood ratio test suggests that the hypothesis 
that coefficients of the assessment mechanism variables are jointly zero has to be rejected at 
the 1 percent significance level. Japanese firms’ affiliate count is positive and highly 
significant, while its square term is negative and significant. This is consistent with our 
expectation in hypotheses 1a and 1b that local agglomeration of Japanese firms in a foreign 
location attracts further entry by other Japanese firms, but that this impact decreases and turns 
                                                 
11
 This is not related to the inclusion of the square term. Models with only a linear term included showed a 
similar insignificant coefficient of the other electronics affiliates count. 
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negative as the increasing level of agglomeration leads to more intensive competition among 
agglomerated firms. The significance of these effects does not change if the bandwagon 
model counts are included in model 3 or if age variables are added in model 4. The estimated 
coefficients in model 2 suggest that the assessment learning mechanism reaches its maximum 
attracting power at more than 600 entries, an out-of-range level far beyond the affiliate 
numbers in any province. However, in model 3, with the bandwagon variables included, the 
estimated maximum effect occurs at 28 affiliates, a level reached by more than 10 provinces 
in the second half of the 1990s.
12
 
 If the bandwagon mechanism variables are added to the agglomeration/assessment 
variables in Model 3, similarly sized firms’ affiliates count and same industry segment 
affiliates count show a positive and significant impact on the location choice of Japanese 
firms, while the other two bandwagon variables are insignificant. Model 3 does have a 
significantly better explanatory power than model 2, as indicated by the LR test. These results 
lend support to Hypothesis 2, where it concerns the effect of „similar‟ model behavior. 
 In model 4 the recentness (captured by age) of the bandwagon and assessment models 
is included. The inclusion of the recentness variables again is a statistical improvement on 
model 3, as the LR test indicates. In addition to the similar firms‟ affiliate counts, the high 
status firm count now shows a significantly positive influence. The age variables for these 
counts are significantly negative: the more recent the location choices by similarly sized, 
same industry segment, and high status firms, the higher their attraction to new affiliate 
entries. The third bandwagon learning variable, same horizontal business group count, and its 
                                                 
12
 This lower level is partly due to the influence of same industry segment affiliates count, which is also likely to 
pick up segment-specific agglomeration affecting the linear term of the all Japanese firms‟ affiliate count. In 
model 4, the effect of the count is also influenced by the age structure of affiliates in the province, such that a 
simple maximum cannot be established. We examined whether the negative sign of the square terms of Japanese 
agglomeration was robust to taking into account the non-linearity of the conditional logit model (Hoetker, 
2007), by calculating signs and significance of the second order derivative of location choice probabilities with 
respect to the agglomeration variables as suggested by Ai and Norton (2003). We found a consistently negative 
sign for the second derivative across observations.  
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age variable carry the expected sign patterns but do not reach statistical significance. In all, 
the results provide support for the bandwagon effects of Hypothesis 2, in particular once the 
impact of recentness is taken into account. Table 4 also shows that the impact of model age is 
very different for the assessment mechanism variable (Japanese affiliate count), as the age 
variable has a significantly positive coefficient, in contrast with the negative coefficient for 
the bandwagon variables. A possible explanation for this positive impact of age is that older 
establishments of model firms that have survived over time are perceived as more strongly 
embedded and more important contributors to local agglomeration benefits than relatively 
recent additions to the agglomeration.
13
   In any case, the results confirm that indeed an 
important difference exists between the roles of model recentness in assessment versus 
bandwagon model-following, in support of Hypothesis 3.  
 In Table 5, the results of the base model for subsequent entries into China are very 
similar to the results for first entries. GDP and GDP per capita as well as the two policy 
dummy variables have significantly positive influences. In addition, agglomeration of other 
electronics affiliates now has a positive and significant coefficient. Adding the Japanese 
affiliate count variables in model 2 significantly improves the fit of the model, while the 
count variable is positive and significant, in accordance with Hypothesis 1a. The square term 
of the Japanese affiliate count variables, however, is insignificant, rejecting Hypothesis 1b for 
subsequent entries.
14
 Inclusion of the bandwagon variables in models 3 and 4 leads to 
markedly different results than those reported for first entries. The Japanese firms‟ affiliate 
                                                 
13
 One indication for this is the correlation between the age of all Japanese affiliates and an indicator of the 
average size of affiliates in the regions (a correlation coefficient of 0.93).  Larger affiliates are likely to 
contribute relatively more to agglomeration benefits (e.g. Shaver and Flyer, 2000). In sensitivity tests, however, 
the average size of affiliates had no significant effect on region choice, which is partly due to the high 
correlation with age.  
14
 This pattern is confirmed by analysis of the second order derivative of the choice probability with respect to 
the Japanese affiliate count, which was insignificant for most observations. We also examined whether entries in 
adjacent provinces affect regions choice, as there may be agglomerations spread over multiple regions resulting 
in inter-regional agglomeration externalities The coefficient of this variable was not significant in the 
subsequent entry model but positive and significant in the first entry model, suggesting that some inter-regional 
agglomeration benefits exist; the results for the other variables continued to hold. 
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count variable remains significant throughout models 3-4. In contrast, among the bandwagon 
variables, only the same industry segment affiliates count is significant with a positive sign, 
while the other bandwagon variables are insignificant. At the same time, the age of the same 
industry segment affiliates count is insignificant in model 4, which is inconsistent with a 
bandwagon learning perspective formulated in Hypothesis 3. We discuss these results in 
more detail in the final section. Overall, these results provide support for Hypothesis 4: in 
subsequent location choices by firms already established in China, the uncertainty driven 
bandwagon effects are much weaker, while the assessment effect remains robust.  
 
Interpretation and Magnitude of Estimated Effects 
 The magnitude of the individual estimated effects can be interpreted in a relatively 
straightforward manner in most cases. As discussed in the empirical method section, the 
average elasticity of the probability that the location is chosen with respect to the independent 
variable approximates the estimated coefficient. The elasticity is (S-1)/S times the coefficient, 
where S is the total number of choices, which gives 29/30 times the coefficient in the current 
setting. Hence, the coefficient of 0.64 for the similarly sized firm model count (model 4, 
Table 4) implies that on average, if a region increases its number of similarly sized firms‟ 
establishments by 10 percent, it has a 6.3 percent higher probability that an entrant chooses to 
locate in it. This elasticity is higher than that of GDP (5.5 percent) but smaller than the 
elasticity estimated for GDP per capita (15.1 percent). For high status models this effect is 
roughly 3.6 percent.  
 The total impact of prior entries by bandwagon model firms can be decomposed into 
three effects. First, there is the direct impact of the bandwagon effect. Second, these entries 
also add to the Japanese agglomeration count. For small initial agglomeration levels (with a 
small impact of the square term), the elasticity of region choice with respect to changes in the 
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number of Japanese affiliates can be calculated as an additional 6 percent. Finally, the impact 
of existing models is affected by the timing (recentness) of model entries. More recent entries 
have a greater positive impact on location choices of prospective entrants. Hence, the impact 
of specific investment models can be very high if they serve as models through different 
learning mechanisms. On the other hand, if the bandwagon models are older entries and not 
replenished by more recent model behavior, the bandwagon learning effects are quickly 
eroded. The elasticities of the probability of region choice with respect to model age range 
between -0.51 and -0.73. The precise magnitude of the impacts of previous model entries 
depends on their role in bandwagon learning and the existing populations of models with 
their age structure.  
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DISCUSSION 
 Why do firms cluster in some locations when they move abroad? In this paper we 
propose and test a broad social learning model of clustering in entry location choice in order 
to integrate three important theoretical perspectives explaining the clustering behavior of 
firms in their foreign expansion: agglomeration benefits, information externalities derived 
from vicarious learning, and the institutional perspective of legitimizing behavior. In the 
integrated model, prospective entrants learn about the relative attractiveness of alternative 
locations by observing the actions of various sets of previous entrants (so-called „models‟). 
On the one hand, learning can be directed at assessing the economic feasibility of entry by 
observing broad sets of models (assessment learning), which corresponds to the investor 
agglomeration and externalities explanation of location choice. On the other hand, learning 
can also be directed at reducing firm-level uncertainties and increasing legitimacy by 
following specific models over others („bandwagoning‟), corresponding to the information 
externalities and legitimacy explanations of location choice imitation. We argue that these 
two forms of social learning have to be juxtaposed, as they can and will operate 
simultaneously, with previous model examples potentially contributing to assessment and 
bandwagon learning at the same time. We argue that two crucial moderators affect the 
relative importance of the two types of learning. First, we propose that the recentness of 
model behavior will not be important for agglomeration externalities but weighs more heavily 
in bandwagon learning, as recentness is positively related to informational and legitimizing 
value. Second, previous target country experience of the investing firm is expected to reduce 
firm level uncertainty and the need to follow model firms‟ examples, but should leave the 
attractiveness of the region due to agglomeration externalities unchanged. 
 Analysis of the location choice for the population of Japanese electronics firms‟ 
entries into China during 1979-2001 provided broad support for our hypotheses. For firms‟ 
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first entries into China, the larger the local agglomeration of other Japanese firms, the 
stronger the attraction of new Japanese entrants, but the impact decreased at higher 
agglomeration sizes. This indicates that entering Japanese firms follow a frequency-based 
imitation strategy in order to situate their foreign establishment in a location that provides the 
highest level of general feasibility, profitability and sustainability, in line with the assessment 
learning mechanism we proposed. At higher levels of agglomeration, the positive effect 
tapers off, presumably as rising competition for customers and inputs reduces the relative 
attractiveness of crowded locations. Besides this general frequency-based imitation, investing 
firms simultaneously engaged in trait-based imitation, whereby they are more selective about 
the specific characteristics of model firms. The strongest preference was found for locations 
that have large numbers of establishments by Japanese firms with similar size, establishments 
within the same industry segment, and establishments by firms with high status due to their 
position as industry leader with internationalization experience. This supports the 
complementary role of the bandwagon learning mechanism through which investing firms 
aim to reduce their uncertainty or increase the legitimacy of their entry decision by following 
specific model firms. The results also confirmed the crucial demarcation between the 
assessment and bandwagon mechanisms in the differential impact of the recentness of model 
behavior. The age of local establishments by similarly sized firms and high status firms 
reduced their positive impact on location decisions, suggesting that it is only recent behavior 
of specific models that provides stronger rationality or legitimizing value, whereas this effect 
was not found for the recentness of agglomeration establishments. On the contrary, the 
impact of Japanese agglomeration in assessment learning even increased with the age of 
establishments, suggesting that older and perhaps larger and more locally embedded affiliates 
contribute more to local agglomeration benefits than younger ones.
15
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 Note that our argument is different from population ecology's basic tenet that organizations' legitimacy (i.e., 
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 Another strategy we followed to empirically distinguish the two mechanisms, 
involved a comparison of first entries into a Chinese region with subsequent entries in 
additional regions. The latter decisions reflect firms‟ exploration of new locations in China 
after having obtained experience operating in the country. The decisions for these subsequent 
entries showed a different pattern. While the impact of assessment models remained strong, 
the bandwagon models, with the exception of same industry segment affiliates, no longer had 
an impact on entry location choice. This confirmed our hypothesis that reduced firm level 
uncertainty (by gathering experience in the host country environment) reduces the need and 
relative value of bandwagon learning but not the benefits of agglomeration.  
 A number of empirical findings in our analysis merit further discussion. The findings 
on the role of prior entries in the same narrowly defined industry segment were mixed. We 
expected a positive bandwagon learning effect, since model firms that are operating in the 
same more narrowly defined markets are likely to provide more relevant information clues. 
Indeed, the count of prior same industry segment entries exerted a positive impact on region 
choice, but we found no evidence that this impact reduced with the age of prior entries or in 
the case of subsequent entries. These findings appear to suggest that following same industry 
segment models is less motivated by the uncertainty reduction that characterizes bandwagon 
learning. The explanation for these results may need to be sought in the multiple types of 
information contained in this variable. Although same industry segment firms are similar in a 
very relevant way and may be a source of bandwagon learning, this similarity may also lead 
to specific agglomeration benefits. For instance, the scale effects for dedicated specialist 
suppliers or demand side externalities related to reduced search costs for customers (e.g. 
Chung and Kalnins; 2001; Baum and Haveman, 1997) may in some cases be stronger at the 
                                                                                                                                                        
their institutional embeddedness and acceptance) increases with time and - as a result- their hazard of failure 
declines (Carroll, 1984; Baum and Oliver, 1992). Population ecology focuses on the age of the organizational 
forms and their survival potential over time. In contrast, neo-institutional theory as applied here, deals with the 
„age‟ (i.e., recentness) of organizational action (e.g. Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 
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more detailed industry segment level. This explanation would be consistent with the absence 
of both recentness and experience moderation.  
We also examined the possible role of within-segment agglomeration in the context of 
inter-firm competition, by investigating whether firms with more capabilities may be 
reluctant to collocate with close competitors out of fear that their best practices and 
technologies will spill over to rivals (e.g. Yoffie, 1993; Shaver and Flyer, 2001; Alcacer and 
Chung, 2007).
16
 Larger and more resourceful firms contribute relatively more to such 
spillovers than smaller, less resourceful, firms. Taking firm size as a rough proxy of resources 
and capabilities, we included the interaction between firm size and the same industry segment 
affiliates count in model 4. The coefficient of this interaction effect was negative and 
significant in both the first and subsequent entry models. These results are consistent with the 
presence of within-industry segment agglomeration externalities and suggest a moderating 
role of inter-firm competition in the firm-specific benefits of such agglomeration.  
 The results provided no support for the impact of horizontal business groups on 
foreign location decisions. We did observe a positive effect of business group entries but only 
for vertical business group agglomeration, where focal firms follow location decisions of 
other vertical group firms, presumably in order to benefit from within-group trade replication. 
This leaves us with less additional explanatory power of legitimizing pressure within 
Japanese horizontal business groups on entry location choice, a finding that is in line with 
earlier results (Henisz and Delios, 2001). One explanation is that horizontal group legitimacy 
requires foremost a high and relevant status of model firms, and that there are heterogeneous 
responses to prior group entries depending on the within-group status (Kim et al., 2004) of 
the investing group member. The status aspect is may already be captured to a large extent in 
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 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention. 
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our analysis through the inclusion of prior entry by high status firms with abundant 
internationalization experience.  
 Our analysis shows that the various perspectives on clustering in foreign entry 
locations play a complementary role in explaining location decisions. Both assessment and 
bandwagon learning mechanisms have to be taken into account simultaneously to explain 
location choice behavior under uncertainty. Hence, in line with Haunschild and Miner (1997) 
we conclude that multiple modes of imitation and their related learning mechanisms are 
operating simultaneously, which underlines previous findings (e.g. Shaver, Mitchell and 
Yeung, 1997; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). This would suggest that managers facing 
uncertainty concerning appropriate entry locations for foreign manufacturing investments 
could combine their own broad assessment of locations in which they rate relevant location 
characteristics (among which foreign investor clusters), with informational clues provided by 
recent entry location choices made by knowledgeable and comparable firms. The latter 
economizes on the costs of information gathering and takes into account that under 
environmental uncertainty a proper individual assessment of future location conditions may 
be difficult to make. On the other hand, a greater weight of bandwagon learning also bares 
the risks inherent to „bandwagoning‟, i.e. that firms follow the mistakes of others rather than 
adopting best practice. In addition, an individual assessment of locations can provide more 
tailored information on the cost and benefits of the alternatives in relation to the specific 
resources and needs of the firm. Future research should examine the performance 
implications of a greater reliance on bandwagon learning vis-à-vis assessment learning in 
decision making on location choice.  
 Our results complement recent findings on organizational mimicry in the broader area 
of foreign entry decisions where the focus has been on the distinction between competitive 
rivalry on the one hand, and the informational and legitimizing influences of models on the 
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other (Gimeno et al, 2005; Delios et al, 2008; Chan et al, 2006). Our results suggest that 
agglomeration effects and assessment learning should be taken into account and distinguished 
as an important driver of foreign investment location decisions that is expected to work in 
conjunction with competitive and bandwagon drivers. Relevant traits in bandwagon learning 
should be well circumscribed and detailed, beyond the aggregated level of same-country and 
(broad) same-industry models taken as relevant in earlier work (e.g. Delios and Henisz, 2000; 
Chan et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007). Within such broad groups of same-country and same-
industry models, traits related to the legitimizing and informational relevance of specific 
models should be distinguished to more accurately assess the role of bandwagon learning as 
distinct from agglomeration effects. Our results also suggest that more attention should be 
paid to firm heterogeneity in bandwagon and assessment learning, as we identified the level 
of firm-level uncertainty an important moderator. Future research on foreign entry and 
location could extend this approach by more specifically integrating models of competitive 
rivalry along the lines in prior work (Gimeno et al., 2005; Delios et al. 2008; Lieberman and 
Asaba, 2006) but should also take into account that competitive considerations may moderate 
agglomeration benefits related to resource heterogeneity (Alcacer and Chung, 1997). In 
general, more research attention needs to be devoted to the systematic analysis of 
organizational mimicry in integrated models that supersede, incorporate, and discriminate 
between different theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain such behavior. 
 Finally, we note some important limitations of our study. While we examine the role 
of a number of specific types of bandwagon models (i.e. those of high status, of similar size, 
those active in a similar industry segment or those belonging to the same business group), we 
could not make a clear distinction between the informational and legitimizing value attached 
to these models' behavior. Partially, this is an issue inherent to the concepts of informational 
and legitimizing bandwagoning, as the legitimizing power of models is seldom devoid of 
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informational value. Partially, however this was also due to our still crude identification of 
relevant models of either type. Future work can attempt to identify in greater detail classes of 
models that are more unequivocally related to one or the other bandwagon mechanism. In the 
case of legitimizing models, one could for instance think of firm surveys to identify high 
status firms rather directly and more independently of the decision process under study. 
 Another limitation of our research was that the empirical analysis focused on one 
industry (electronics) and firms from one home country (Japan) investing in another (China). 
Japanese entry locations in the Chinese electronics industry was an appropriate testing ground 
for our integrated theoretical framework due to the strong clustering observed among 
Japanese firms, the large number of entries in China after its investment liberalization 
policies, and the lack of information and high uncertainty concerning China‟s investment 
environment. On the other hand, this focus necessarily reduces the scope for generalizations. 
Replication and extension of this type of study for location decisions in other countries or 
industries, or by firms from different home countries will help build more insight into the 
importance of the various types of model-follower patterns and mechanisms in international 
entry location decisions. In doing so it adds to our understanding of one of the principal 
modes of globalization. 
 
REFERENCES 
Abrahamson, E., L. Rosenkopf. 1993. Institutional and competitive bandwagons. Using 
mathematical modeling as a tool to explore innovation diffusion. Academy of Management 
Review, 18 487-517. 
Ai, C., E.C. Norton. 2003. Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models. Economic Letters, 80 
123-129. 
Alcacer J., W. Chung. 2007. Location strategies and knowledge spillovers. Management 
Science, 53(5) 760-776. 
 44 
 
Amburgey, T.L., Dacin, T. and Kelly, D. 1994. Disruptive selection and population 
segmentation: Interpopulation competition as a segregation process in Baum J.A.C. and 
Singh J.V. (eds.) Evolutionary dynamics of organizations, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 240-254. 
Appold, S.J. 1995. Agglomeration, interorganizational networks, and competitive performance 
in the U.S. metalworking sector. Economic Geography, 71 27-65.  
Argote, L. 1999. Organizational forgetting. in Argote, L. Organizational Learning. Creating, 
retaining and transferring knowledge, Kluwer academic publishers. 
Argote, L., S.L. Beckman, S.L. and D. Epple. 1990. The persistence and transfer of learning 
in organizational settings. Management Science, 36 140-154. 
Argote, L. and Todorova, G. 2007. Organizational learning, International Review of Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology, 22 193 - 234. 
Banerjee, A. V. 1992. A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 
797-817. 
Baum J.A.C. and S.J. Mezias. 1992. Localized Competition and Organizational Failure in the 
Manhattan Hotel Industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37 580-604. 
Baum, J. and K.B. Dahlin. 2007. Aspiration performance and railroads‟ patterns of learning 
from train wrecks and crashes. Organization Science, 18 368-385 
Baum, J. and P. Ingram, P. 1998. Survival-enhancing learning in the Manhattan hotel industry, 
1898-1980. Management Science, 44 996-1016. 
Baum, J.A.C. and H.A. Haveman. 1997. Love thy neighbour? Differentiation and agglomeration 
in the Manhattan Hotel Industry, 1898-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42 304-338. 
Baum, J.A.C., S. Xiao Li and J.M. Usher. 2000. Making the Next Move: How Experimental and 
Vicarious Learning Shape the Locations of Chains' Acquisitions. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 45 766-801. 
Baum, J.A. and Oliver, C. 1992. Institutional embeddedness and the dynamics of organizational 
populations. American Sociological Review 57 540-559. 
Belderbos R. and L. Sleuwaegen. 1996. Japanese firms and the decision to invest abroad: 
Industrial groups and regional core networks. Review of Economics and Statistics, 78 214–
220. 
Belderbos R. and L. Sleuwaegen. 2005. Competitive drivers and international plant 
configuration strategies: a product level test. Strategic Management Journal, 26 577-593. 
 45 
 
Belderbos R., G. Capannelli and K. Fukao. 2001. Backward vertical linkages of foreign 
manufacturing affiliates: evidence from Japanese multinationals. World Development, 29 
189-208. 
Belderbos, R. and M.A. Carree. 2002. The location of Japanese investment in China: 
Agglomeration effect, Keiretsu and firm heterogeneity. Journal of Japanese and 
International Economies, 16 194-211. 
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer and I. Welch. 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and 
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100 992-1026. 
Burns, L.R. and D.R. Wholey. 1993. Adoption and abandonment of matrix management 
programs: effects of organizational characteristics and interorganizational networks. 
Academy of Management Journal, 36 106-138. 
Carroll, G. R. 1984. Organizational ecology. Annual Review of Sociology, 10 71-93. 
Chan, C. M., S. Makino and T. Isobe. 2006. Interdependent behavior in foreign direct 
investment: the multi-level effects of prior entry and prior exit on foreign market entry. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 37 642-665. 
Chang S.J. and S. Park. 2005. Types of firms generating network externalities and MNCs' co-
location decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 26 595-616. 
China National Bureau of Statistics. 2006. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China National 
Bureau of Statistics (http://www.stats.gov.cn/.) 
Chung W. 2001. Mode, size, and location of foreign direct investments and industry markups. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 45 185-211. 
Chung, W. and A. Kalnins. 2001. Agglomeration effects and performance: a test of the Texas 
lodging industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22 967-986. 
Chung, W. and J.Y. Song. 2004. Sequential investment, firm motives, and agglomeration of 
Japanese electronics firms in the United States. Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, 13 539-560. 
Coughlin, C.C. and E. Segev. 2000. Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Spatial Econometric 
Study. World Economy, 23 1-23. 
Cyert, R.M. and J.G. March. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
D'Aunno, T., M. Succi and J.A. Alexander. 2000. The role of institutional and market forces in 
divergent organizational change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45 679-703. 
Davis, G.F. 1991. Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the 
intercorporate network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 583-613. 
 46 
 
Davis, G.F. and H.R. Greve. 1997. Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 
1980s. American Journal of Sociology, 103 1-37. 
Delios A. and P.W. Beamish. 2001. Survival and Profitability: the Roles of Experience and 
Intangible Assets in Foreign Subsidiary Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 44 
1028-1038. 
Delios A. and W.J. Henisz. 2000. Japanese firm‟s investment strategies in emerging economies. 
Academy of Management Journal, 43 443-476 
Delios, A., A.S. Gaur and S. Makino. 2008. The Timing of International Expansion: 
Information, Rivalry and Imitation Among Japanese Firms, 1980–2002. Journal of 
Management Studies, 45 169-195. 
Delios, A., C. Zhou and J. Y. Yang. 2000. Locational Determinants of Japanese Foreign Direct 
Investment in China. Asia. Pacific Journal of Management, 19 63–86. 
DiMaggio, R.J. and W.W. Powell. 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48 148-160. 
Galaskiewicz, J. and S. Wasserman. 1989. Mimetic processes within an interorganizational 
field: An empirical test. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34 454-479. 
Gerlach, M.L. 1992. Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization of Japanese Business. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Ghosal, V. and P. Loungani. 2000. The Differential Impact of Uncertainty on Investment in 
Small and Large Businesses. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82 338-343. 
Gilbert, R.J. and M.B. Lieberman. 1987. Investment and cooperation in oligopolistic industries. 
Rand Journal of Economics, 18 17-33. 
Gilbert, R.J. and M.B. Lieberman. 1987. Investment and coordination in oligopolistic industries. 
Rand Journal of Economics, 18 17-33. 
Gimeno, J., R.E. Hoskisson, B.D. Beal and W.P. Wan. 2005. Explaining the Clustering of 
International Expansion Moves: a critical test in the U.S. Telecommunications industry. 
Academy of Management Journal, 48 297-319. 
Greene, W.H. 1997. Econometric Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall. 
Greve, H. 1998. Managerial cognition and the mimetic adoption of market positions: what you 
see is what you do. Strategic Management Journal, 19 967-988. 
Greve, H. 2005. Interorganizational Learning and Heterogeneous Social Structure. Organization 
Studies, 26 1025-1047. 
Guillén, M.F. 2002. Imitation, inertia and foreign expansion: South Korean firms and business 
groups in China, 1987-1995. Academy of Management Journal, 45 509-525. 
 47 
 
Guler, I., M. Guillén and J. Muir Macpherson. 2002. Global competition, institutions and the 
diffusion of organizational practices: the international spread of ISO 9000 quality 
certificates. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47 207-232. 
Han, S.-K. 1994. Mimetic isomorphism and its effect on the audit services market. Social 
Forces, 73 637-663. 
Hannan, M.T. and J. Freeman. 1977. The population ecology of organizations. American 
Journal of Sociology, 82 929-964. 
Haunschild, P.R. 1993. Interorganizational imitation: the impact of interlocks on corporate 
acquisition activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38 564-592. 
Haunschild, P.R. and A.S. Miner. 1997. Modes of interorganizational imitation: the effects of 
outcome salience and uncertainty. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42 472-500. 
Hausman, J. A. and D. McFadden. 1984. Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model. 
Econometrica, 52 1377-1398. 
Haveman, H.A. 1993. Follow the leader: mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38 593-627. 
He, C. 2002. Information costs, agglomeration economies and the location of foreign direct 
investment in China. Regional Studies, 36 1029-1036. 
He, C. 2003. Location of foreign manufacturers in China: agglomeration economies and country 
of origin effects. Papers in Regional Science, 82 351-372. 
Head K. and J. Ries. 1996. Inter-city Competition for Foreign Investment: Static and Dynamic 
Effects of China‟s Incentive Areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 40 38–60. 
Head K., T. Mayer and J. Ries. 2002. Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction: Are Decisions on 
Foreign Direct Investment Strategic Complements? Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, 11 452-471. 
Head, K., J. Ries and D. Swenson. 1995. Agglomeration benefits and location choice: Evidence 
from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States. Journal of International 
Economics, 38 223–247. 
Henisz, W.J. and A. Delios. 2001. Uncertainty, Imitation, and Plant Location: Japanese 
Multinational Corporations, 1990-1996. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46 443-475. 
Hoetker, G., 2007. The Use of Logit and Probit Models in Strategic Management Research: 
Critical Issues. Strategic Management Journal, 28(4) 331–343. 
Krugman P. 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy, 
99 483–499. 
 48 
 
Kim, H., R. E.  Hoskisson and W. P. Wan. 2004. Power dependence, diversification strategy, 
and performance in keiretsu member firm,  Strategic Management Journal  25 (7) 613-636 
Levitt, B. and J.G. March. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 14 319-
340. 
Li, J.T., J.Y. Yang and D.R. Yue. 2007. Identity, Community, and Audience: How Wholly 
Owned Foreign Subsidiaries Gain Legitimacy in China. Academy of Management Journal, 
50 175-190. 
Lieberman, M.B. and S. Asaba. 2006. Why do firms imitate each other. Academy of 
Management Review, 31 366-385. 
March, J.G. and H.A. Simon. 1958. Organizations, New York: Wiley. 
Marshall A. 1922. Principals of Economics, 8
th
 edition, London: MacMillan. 
Martin X., W. Mitchell and A. Swaminathan. 1998. Organizational Evolution in the 
Interorganizational Environment: Incentives and Constraints on International Expansion 
Strategy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43 566-601. 
Mayer T. and J.L. Muchielli. 1998. Hierarchical Location Choice and Multinational Firm 
Strategy. paper presented at the Western Economic Association conference at Lake Tahoe, 
June 28–July 2, 1998. 
Meyer, J.W. and B. Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83 340-363. 
Meyer, J.W. and Scott, W.R. 1983. Organizational environments: Ritual and Rationality. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Miller, S.R and L. Eden. 2006. Local density and foreign subsidiary performance. Academy of 
Management journal 49 (2) 341-355. 
Mori, K. 2002. Business Groups Adapt to Change. Nikkei Weekly, 24 June 2002. 
Palmer, D.A., P.D. Jennings and X. Zhou. 1993. Late Adoption of the Multidivisional Form by 
Large U.S. Corporations: Institutional, Political, and Economic Accounts. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 38 100-131. 
Pennings, J.M. and K. Lee. 2002. Mimicry and the market. Academy of Management Journal, 
45 144-162. 
Peteraf, M. and Shanley, 1997, Getting to know you: A theory of strategic group identity, 
Strategic Management Journal, 18 165 - 186. 
Porac, J.F. and Thomas, H. 1990. Taxonomic mental models in competitor definition. Academy 
of Management Review, 15 224-240. 
 49 
 
Porac, J.F., H. Thomas, F. Wilson, D. Paton and A. Kanfer. 1995. Rivalry and the industry 
model of Scottish knitwear producers. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40 203-227. 
Reuvid, J. and L. Yong. 2000. Doing Business with China. Kogan Page: London. 
Rosenbloom, J. 1990. Marshallian factor market externalities and the dynamics of industrial 
location. Journal of Urban Economics, 28 349-370. 
Sako, M. 1992. Prices, Quality, and Trust: Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Japan. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Scott, R.W. 1992. Organizations. Rational, natural and open systems. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Shaver J.M. and F. Flyer. 2000. Agglomeration economies, firm heterogeneity, and foreign 
direct investment in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 21 1175–1193. 
Shaver J.M., W. Mitchell and B. Yeung. 1997. The effect of own-firm and other-firm experience 
on foreign direct investment survival in the United States, 1987-92. Strategic Management 
Journal, 18 811-824  
Smith D.F. and R. Florida. 1994. Agglomeration and industrial location: An econometric 
analysis of Japanese-affiliated manufacturing establishments in automotive-related 
industries. Journal of Urban Economics, 36 23-41. 
Sorenson O. and P.G. Audia. 2000. The social structure of entrepreneurial activity: geographic 
concentration of footwear production in the United States. American Journal of Sociology, 
106 424-461. 
Strang, D. and N.B. Tuma. 1993. Spatial and temporal heterogeneity in diffusion. American 
Journal of Sociology, 99 614-639. 
Tolbert , P. S. and L. G. Zucker. 1983. Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of 
organizations: the diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935.", Administrative Science 
Quarterly 28, 22-39. 
Wheeler D. and A. Mody. 1992. International investment location decision. Journal of 
International Economics, 33 57–76. 
Xia, J., J. Tan and D. Tan. 2008. Mimetic Entry and Bandwagon Effect: The Rise and Decline of 
International Equity Joint Venture in China. Strategic Management Journal,  29 195–217. 
Xiao, G. 2004. People‟s Republic of China‟s Round-Tripping FDI: Scale, Causes and 
Implications. ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 7. Manila: Asian Development Bank 
Yoffie, 1993,  Foreign direct investment in semiconductors. In Foreign Direct Investment, in 
Froot K (ed). University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL; 197–222. 
 50 
 
Table 1. 
Parallel Social Learning Perspectives on Location Choice Decisions 
 
 
ASSESSMENT LEARNING 
PERSPECTIVE 
                                                                                      
 
BANDWAGON LEARNING                                                                                
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Observation focus 
 
Wide range of prior entries 
 
Narrow: subsets of prior entries 
 
Implicit traditional decision 
frame 
 
General, contextual          
 
Model-specific 
Information  instrumentality 
 
Assess long-term feasibility, 
profitability, sustainability of 
entry in a location 
  
Lower immediate decision uncertainty  
 
Object differences: 
Type of models being followed 
 
 
Type of resulting imitation 
pattern 
 
 
All firms that contribute to 
agglomeration benefits 
 
Broad, frequency-based 
 
 
. 
 
 
Specific (sets of) firms of particular informational 
relevance 
 
Focussed, trait-based 
 
 
 
 
Contingency differences 
(response moderation) 
 
Recentness of models’ 
behavior  
 
Focal firms’ own previous 
experience 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited 
 
 
Limited 
 
 
 
 
Strong; informational value increases with 
recentness 
 
Strong; informational value and uncertainty decline 
with own experience 
 
Result 
 
Agglomeration effects 
 
Bandwagon effects  
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Table 2. 
Geographic distribution of new Japanese electronics 
manufacturing establishments in China (1979 – 2001) 
First entries and subsequent entries into additional provinces 
 
Province  First 
Entry 
Subsequent 
Entry 
All 
entries 
Guangdong  154 67 221 
Shanghai  103 36 139 
Jiangsu  56 48 104 
Liaoning  31 16 47 
Beijing  20 17 37 
Tianjin  20 16 36 
Zhejiang  19 9 28 
Shandong  15 8 23 
Fujian  7 10 17 
Hebei  3 4 7 
Sichuan  3 5 8 
Anhui  2 4 6 
Hubei  1 3 4 
Henan  1 2 3 
Shanxi  0 3 3 
Guangxi  1 1 2 
Shaanxi  2 0 2 
Heilongjiang  1 0 1 
Hunan  0 1 1 
Inner Mongolia  1 0 1 
Jiangxi  0 1 1 
Jilin  1 0 1 
    
Total 441 251 692 
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Table 3a. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of variables. First Entries 
 
First entries mean st.dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Province choice 0,33 0,18
2  All Japanese firms' affiliate count 1,83 1,42 0,31
3  All Japanese affiliate firms' count - squared 3,29 5,67 0,33 0,93
4  Age of Japanese firms' affiliate 0,69 0,80 0,18 0,73 0,53
5  Similarly sized firms' affiliates count 0,56 1,14 0,33 0,94 0,95
6  Age of similarly sized firms' affiliates 0,44 0,70 0,22 0,82 0,73 0,68 0,83
7 Same industry segment affiliates count 0,23 0,53 0,30 0,73 0,80 0,41 0,76 0,55
8 Age of same industry segment affiliates count 0,23 0,55 0,23 0,71 0,79 0,46 0,69 0,59 0,85
9  Horizontal business group firms' affiliates count 0,60 0,32 0,72 0,28 0,27 0,19 0,28 0,22 0,23 0,21
10  Age of horizontal business group firms' affiliates 0,61 0,36 0,48 0,22 0,20 0,26 0,21 0,19 0,16 0,16 0,85
11  High status firms' affiliates count 0,54 0,85 0,28 0,93 0,92 0,65 0,88 0,74 0,72 0,69 0,26 0,26
12  Age of high status firms' affiliates 0,52 0,76 0,17 0,75 0,62 0,76 0,62 0,62 0,48 0,60 0,19 0,19 0,82
13 Other electronics foreign affiliate count 3,24 2,24 0,21 0,78 0,64 0,78 0,67 0,65 0,51 0,51 0,21 0,19 0,75 0,75
14 Other electronics foreign affiliate count - squared 2,43 29,18 0,14 0,34 0,34 0,22 0,32 0,26 0,26 0,24 0,97 0,76 0,35 0,31 0,45
15  Same vertical business group firms' affiliate count 0,39 0,23 0,12 0,28 0,35 0,15 0,29 0,19 0,24 0,19 0,14 0,14 0,28 0,19 0,29 0,17
16  Province GDP 6,76 1,20 0,15 0,59 0,46 0,58 0,56 0,49 0,39 0,39 0,18 0,17 0,55 0,55 0,82 0,38 0,15
17  Province GDP per capita -1,19 0,76 0,17 0,76 0,64 0,53 0,64 0,59 0,49 0,51 0,21 0,18 0,69 0,62 0,74 0,46 0,23 0,62
18  Province manufacturing wage 8,25 0,57 0,93 0,49 0,50 0,38 0,46 0,47 0,38 0,39 0,16 0,13 0,52 0,48 0,51 0,42 0,16 0,47 0,85
19  Province has SEZ/OCC area (1982-1992) 0,90 0,47 0,12 0,16 -0,17 0,78 0,32 0,37 -0,15 0,16 -0,27 -0,26 0,15 0,32 -0,58 -0,75 -0,28 -0,75 -0,27 -0,29
20  Province has SEZ/OCC area (1993-22) 0,51 1,22 0,26 0,61 0,63 0,42 0,66 0,46 0,52 0,43 0,15 0,14 0,62 0,56 0,58 0,34 0,18 0,43 0,35 0,26 -0,95
21  Province has seaport 0,33 0,47 0,23 0,63 0,54 0,48 0,58 0,52 0,44 0,41 0,16 0,12 0,55 0,51 0,55 0,19 0,14 0,43 0,37 0,14 0,23 0,59
22  Past colonial ties with Japan 0,10 0,31 -0,16 0,30 0,28 -0,39 0,58 0,34 0,30 0,34 0,29 0,15 0,20 -0,18 -0,14 -0,97 -0,12 0,19 0,94 -0,80 -0,28 -0,74 0,00  
 
Note: all variables except dummy variables are in natural logarithms 
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Table 3b. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of variables. Subsequent Entries into additional provinces. 
 
Subsequent entries mean st.dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Province choice 0,35 0,18
2  All Japanese firms' affiliate count 1,91 1,43 0,32
3  All Japanese affiliate firms' count - squared 3,52 5,80 0,35 0,93
4  Age of Japanese firms' affiliate 0,77 0,83 0,17 0,73 0,53
5  Similarly sized firms' affiliates count 0,61 1,12 0,32 0,94 0,94 0,67
6  Age of similarly sized firms' affiliates 0,52 0,76 0,27 0,79 0,68 0,72 0,89
7 Same industry segment affiliates count 0,22 0,55 0,39 0,72 0,79 0,48 0,73 0,52
8 Age of same industry segment affiliates count 0,26 0,60 0,22 0,69 0,69 0,46 0,68 0,54 0,84
9  Horizontal business group firms' affiliates count 0,14 0,47 0,12 0,38 0,37 0,24 0,39 0,29 0,27 0,26
10  Age of horizontal business group firms' affiliates 0,13 0,43 0,85 0,38 0,26 0,25 0,32 0,27 0,18 0,20 0,84
11  High status firms' affiliates count 0,65 0,88 0,29 0,95 0,91 0,66 0,96 0,73 0,78 0,67 0,36 0,28
12  Age of high status firms' affiliates 0,61 0,79 0,18 0,76 0,66 0,78 0,66 0,68 0,46 0,51 0,25 0,25 0,82
13 Other electronics foreign affiliate count 3,55 2,17 0,23 0,79 0,63 0,72 0,70 0,66 0,55 0,59 0,29 0,26 0,76 0,76
14 Other electronics foreign affiliate count - squared 25,14 36,94 0,82 0,21 0,24 0,96 0,22 0,16 0,18 0,16 0,81 0,57 0,22 0,18 0,31
15  Same vertical business group firms' affiliate count 0,56 0,26 0,15 0,37 0,39 0,20 0,37 0,26 0,29 0,25 0,17 0,13 0,35 0,24 0,28 0,98
16  Province GDP 7,50 1,15 0,16 0,59 0,45 0,62 0,59 0,50 0,38 0,38 0,23 0,23 0,57 0,58 0,83 0,29 0,20
17  Province GDP per capita -0,95 0,68 0,18 0,72 0,66 0,54 0,68 0,58 0,52 0,51 0,29 0,24 0,72 0,66 0,73 0,36 0,27 0,58
18  Province manufacturing wage 8,48 0,50 0,11 0,45 0,48 0,34 0,45 0,38 0,35 0,36 0,18 0,16 0,49 0,46 0,39 0,33 0,19 0,35 0,88
19  Province has SEZ/OCC area (1982-1992) 0,33 0,27 0,69 0,34 -0,14 0,35 -0,13 0,50 -0,15 -0,17 -0,28 -0,29 -0,27 0,71 -0,38 -0,46 -0,16 -0,58 -0,16 -0,23
20  Province has SEZ/OCC area (1993-22) 0,58 0,97 0,29 0,69 0,62 0,37 0,59 0,47 0,52 0,42 0,21 0,18 0,65 0,51 0,57 0,26 0,26 0,42 0,35 0,19 -0,60
21  Province has seaport 0,37 0,46 0,23 0,66 0,59 0,45 0,67 0,52 0,47 0,43 0,25 0,18 0,59 0,53 0,56 0,12 0,24 0,44 0,42 0,15 0,14 0,64
22  Past colonial ties with Japan 0,99 0,30 -0,23 0,19 0,23 -0,24 0,31 -0,13 0,33 0,32 0,42 0,25 0,38 0,19 0,19 -0,95 -0,42 0,11 0,11 -0,92 -0,15 -0,86 -0,13  
 
Note: all variables except dummy variables are in natural logarithms 
 54 
 
Table 4. Chinese Region Characteristics Predicting Japanese Affiliate Location Choice 
First entries into China.    
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
All Japanese firms' affiliate count 0.803*** 0.757*** 0.832***
(0.211) (0.227) (0.261)
All Japanese affiliate firms' count - squared -0.062* -0.113*** -0.208***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.049)
Age of Japanese firms' affiliate count 0.678***
(0.226)
Similarly sized firms' affiliates count 0.389*** 0.638***
(0.148) (0.164)
Age of similarly sized firms' affiliates count -0.530***
(0.180)
Same industry segment affiliates count 0.251** 0.266*
(0.112) (0.145)
Age of same industry segment affiliates count -0.054
(0.138)
Same horizontal business group firms' affiliates count -0.152 0.078
(0.209) (0.261)
Age of same horizontal business group firms' affiliates count -0.515
(0.327)
High status firms' affiliates count -0.177 0.371*
(0.165) (0.219)
Age of high status firms' affiliates count
-0.760***
(0.227)
Other electronics foreign affiliate count 0.027 -0.095 -0.010 0.071
(0.147) (0.162) (0.177) (0.189)
Other electronics foreign affiliate count - squared 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
Vertical business group affiliate count 0.299 0.296 0.358* 0.376**
(0.184) (0.186) (0.188) (0.188)
 Province GDP 0.942*** 0.874*** 0.764*** 0.566**
(0.189) (0.185) (0.197) (0.224)
 Province GDP per capita 2.098*** 1.535*** 1.401*** 1.524***
(0.442) (0.445) (0.449) (0.499)
 Province manufacturing wage 0.575 -0.070 -0.037 0.147
(0.634) (0.705) (0.711) (0.774)
 Province has SEZ/OCC area (1982-1992) 0.531*** 0.256** 0.278** 0.330**
(0.113) (0.124) (0.124) (0.137)
 Province has SEZ/OCC area (1993-2002) 0.269*** 0.139 0.155* 0.285***
(0.083) (0.091) (0.091) (0.105)
 Province has seaport 0.550** 0.541** 0.423* 0.247
(0.231) (0.234) (0.247) (0.251)
 Past colonial ties with Japan 0.418 -0.268 -0.189 0.133
(0.332) (0.398) (0.400) (0.438)
Observations 13230 13230 13230 13230
Loglikelihood -882.77 -872.75 -865.68 -850.89
McFadden's Pseudo R-squared 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43
Chi squared test 1234.3*** 1254.4*** 1268.5*** 1298.1***
LR test (model 2 - model 1) 20.1***
LR test (model 3 - model 2) 14.1**
LR test (model 4 - model 3) 29,6***  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%; 1%, respectively. Number of 
observations equals number of choosers times number of alternatives (regions) per choice. 
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Table 5. Chinese region characteristics predicting Japanese Affiliate Location Choice 
Subsequent Entries into Additional Chinese Regions. 
 
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
All Japanese firms' affiliate count 0.566** 0.752** 0.877**
(0.262) (0.308) (0.411)
All Japanese affiliate firms' count - squared 0.006 -0.025 -0.085
(0.042) (0.051) (0.074)
 Age of Japanese firms' affiliate count 0.261
(0.257)
 Similarly sized firms' affiliates count 0.190 0.273
(0.193) (0.220)
 Age of similarly sized firms' affiliates count -0.206
(0.236)
Same industry segment affiliates count 0.401*** 0.490***
(0.144) (0.174)
Age of same industry segment affiliates count -0.133
(0.160)
Same horizontal business group firms' affiliates count 0.046 0.134
(0.166) (0.272)
Age of same horizontal business group firms' affiliates count -0.237
(0.473)
High status firms' affiliates count -0.511 -0.269
(0.332) (0.356)
Age of high status firms' affiliates count
-0.349
(0.287)
Other electronics foreign affiliate count 0.296* 0.246* 0.386** 0.428**
(0.153) (0.140) (0.171) (0.195)
Other electronics foreign affiliate count - squared -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Vertical business group affiliate count 0.040 -0.081 -0.075 -0.061
(0.215) (0.207) (0.220) (0.218)
 Province GDP 0.827*** 0.587*** 0.400* 0.261
(0.220) (0.205) (0.226) (0.262)
 Province GDP per capita 2.027*** 1.220** 1.024* 0.999*
(0.461) (0.498) (0.536) (0.600)
 Province manufacturing wage -0.345 -1.213 -1.351 -1.080
(0.684) (0.837) (0.889) (0.966)
 Province has SEZ/OCC area (1982-1992) 0.530*** 0.252 0.324* 0.374**
(0.163) (0.165) (0.177) (0.188)
 Province has SEZ/OCC area (1993-2002) 0.300*** 0.111 0.140 0.224**
(0.100) (0.103) (0.100) (0.098)
 Province has seaport -0.189 -0.149 -0.327 -0.350
(0.248) (0.248) (0.306) (0.308)
 Past colonial ties with Japan 0.226 -0.382 -0.264 -0.103
(0.362) (0.412) (0.449) (0.482)
Observations 7150 7150 7150 7150
Loglikelihood -525.80 -516.60 -509.91 -507.89
McFadden's Pseudo R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.40
Chi squared test 524.4*** 600.3*** 620.7*** 736.4***
LR test (model 2 - model 1) 18,4***
LR test (model 3 - model 2) 13.4**
LR test (model 4 - model 3) 4.1  
Notes: Error terms clustered by parent firm; Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%; 
1%, respectively. Number of observations equals number of choosers times number of alternatives (regions) per 
choice.
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Appendix: Descriptions of variables 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   
Variable Description Hypothesis (sign)
Province choice Dummy variable taking value 1 if a province/region is chosen to establish the manufacturing affiliate
All Japanese firms' affiliate count Logarithm of the count of all Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the broadly defined electronics sector in the 
Chinese province
H1 (+)
All Japanese affiliate firms' count - squared Square of the Japanese affiliate count H1b (-)
Age of Japanese firms' affiliate count Logarithm of the average age of affiliates included in the all Japanese affiliate count at the time of establishment of 
the focal affiliate
Similarly sized firms' affiliates count Logarithm of the count of manufacturing affiliates established by similarly sized Japanese electronics firms in the 
province. Similar size is defined as parent firm employment in the same or adjacent sample decile.
H2 (+)
Age of similarly sized firms' affiliates count Logarithm of the average age of affiliates included in the similarly sized firms' affiliate count at the time of 
establishment of the focal affiliate
H3 (-)
Same industry segment affiliates count
Logarithm of the count of manufacturing affiliates that operate in the same narrowly defined segment of the 
electronics industry in the province. 
H2 (+)
Age of same industry segment affiliates count
Logarithm of the average age of affiliates included in the same industry segment affiliates count at the time of 
establishment of the focal affiliate
H3(-)
Same horizontal business group firms' affiliates count Logarithm of the count of manufacturing affiliates established in the province by firms belonging to the same 
Japanese horizontal business group (keiretsu).
H2 (+)
Age of same horizontal business group firms' affiliates 
count
Logarithm of the average age of affiliates included in the same horizontal business group firms' affiliate count at the 
time of establishment of the focal affiliate
H3 (-)
High status firms' affiliates count Logarithm of the count of manufacturing affilliates established in the province by the 16 Japanese  electronics firms 
with the largest number of electronics affilaites in Asia
H2 (+)
Age of high status firms' affiliates count Logarithm of the average age of affiliates included in the high status firms' affiliate count at the time of 
establishment of the focal affiliate
H3 (-)
Other electronics foreign affiliate count Logarithm of the count of electronics manufacturing affiliates of non-Japanese foreign firms in the province
Other electronics foreign affiliate count - squared Square of the non-Japanese affiliate count
Province GDP Logarithm of gross domestic product (in hundred million Chinese Yuan) of the province.
Province GDP per capita Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita of the province (in hundred million Chinese Yuan).
Province manufacturing wage Logarithm of the average annual wage (in Chinese Yuan) of the province in the year of entry by the focal affiliate
Province has SEZ/OCC area (1982-1992) Dummy variable taking value 1 if the province hosts a Special Econoimc Zone or an Opening Coastal City; for 
entries in the years 1980-1991
Province has SEZ/OCC area (1993-2001) Dummy variable taking value 1 if the province hosts a Special Econoimc Zone or an Opening Coastal City; for 
entries in the years 1991-2001
Province has seaport Dummy variable taking value 1 if the province has a seaport
Past colonial ties with Japan Province has had previous colonial ties with Japan (Heilionjiang, Liaoning, Jilin)  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Note: all variables are measured the year before the entry of the focal firm 
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